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Over the years, traffic congestion has become an ever more serious issue in
many mega-regions worldwide, and has caused huge economic and environmental
loss. Having witnessed big increase in the sales of passenger cars, some authorities
have turned to vehicle ownership quota policy, which is a direct tool to control
the number of vehicles on the road. Two of the most typical ownership quota
policies, are the vehicle plate lottery system and vehicle plate auction system. This
thesis developed an analytical framework that utilized the joint vehicle ownership
and usage decision model to quantitatively measure the impacts of the two quota
policies, in terms of compensating variation. It is shown that implementation of
vehicle plate lottery system will invite more households who have lower preference
of owning a vehicle, and will result in a decrease in net social impact. The thesis
then proposed an alternative policy that restricts the lottery to only previous car
owners, and shows that it will give a higher net social impact. A numerical example
is then conducted to determine the optimal quota ratio for each of the policies, and
to compare their social benefits. Various policy implications and future research
directions are also discussed.
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Over the years, along with the progress of motorization and urbanization,
traffic congestion has become an ever more serious issue worldwide, especially in the
metropolitan areas. According to the 2011 TTi Annual Report Schrank et al. (2011),
congestion in metropolitan areas in US results in 1.94 billion gallons in wasted fuel
and $100.9 billion in total cost. In Sao Paolo, Brazil, cost of traffic congestion is
nearly 20 billion US dollars in 2008. China, as one of the fast growing economies
in the world, is also witnessing more severe traffic congestion. Congestion cost in
Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai, three of the largest metropolitan cities in China,
is more than 200 CNY per person per month.
Under this background, various policy tools (e.g. priority transit, high occu-
pancy vehicle lanes, congestion pricing) have been proposed and implemented to
mitigate congestion by allocating scarce road space more efficiently. Congestion
pricing, as one of the means for transportation demand management, has been im-
plemented in a number of urban areas including Singapore London and Stockholm.
Singapore first introduced the Area License Scheme(ALS) in 1975. The scheme
requires vehicles entering the central ”Restricted Zone” during peak hours to pur-
chase a license. Starting from 1998, ALS has been replaced by the new Electrical
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Road Pricing scheme(ERP). Using microwave technology, tolls are collected on ar-
terials and expressways that varies by time of day. Stockholm and London have
implemented similar congestion charging schemes using automatic plate number
recognition technologies.
More recently, some cities, especially in developing countries, started looking
at alternatives that directly control the number of vehicles on the road. In 1989,
Mexico City imposed a regulation that limits each car from driving on a specific day
of the week according to their license plate number(”Day without a Car”) (Eskeland
and Feyzioglu, 1997). Similar road space rationing policies have been implemented
in Sao Paolo and Beijing during the 2008 Olympic Game (Lim, Accessed on Arpil
8, 2011).
Also, more drastic policies that restrict vehicle ownerships have been adopted
by several cities. For example, Singapore implemented the Vehicle Quota Sys-
tem(VQS) in 1990 (Barter, 2005). The VQS sets a quota to the number of new
vehicles to be registered in Singapore each year. Households need to bid for a Certifi-
cate of Entitlement (COE) through online auction system in order to own a vehicle.
Wth thte quota system and road pricing policy, fewer than 30% of Singaporeans
own a vehicle. Similar to Singapore, started from 1994, Shanghai implemented the
New Plate Auction system, by auctioning the new vehicle plate license. Figure 1.1
shows the annual plates that will be issued each year. Figure 1.2 summarizes the
vehicle plate price in Shanghai. From figure1.1 and 1.2, we can see that along with
the task to control number of vehicles, this plate auction system also helps generate
revenue for the government. Figure 1.3 shows the ratio of the number of plates
2
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Figure 1.1: Number of Plates Issued in Shanghai Vehicle Plate Auction
Instead of auctioning, Beijing started implemented a plate lottery system in
2010, limiting the number of plates issued to passenger vehicles to 20,000 per month.
Figure 1.4 shows the winning probability of this lottery during the first 15 months
it’s been implemented. Comparing figure 1.3 and 1.4, we see that since the entry
fees for plate lottery is small, far more people will express their interest in obtaining
a license plate in Beijing than in Shanghai.
Along with the fast economic development, China is also experiencing rapid
increase in motor vehicle ownership. Vehicle ownership quota as a direct travel
demand management tool could be adopted by more metropolitan areas, either as
a permanent policy or as a temporary policy during special events. Under this
background, it is important to look into the impacts of such policies.
Both theoretical and empirical studies on road pricing have been abundant
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Figure 1.4: Winning Probability of Beijing Plate Lottery
2004). In contrast, fewer studies have been conducted to evaluate rationing as a
policy tool to address congestion problem, although its role in resource allocation
has been widely discussed in other industries (e.g. Evans, 1983). A pioneering
study in transportation by Daganzo (1995) shows that a Pareto optimum conges-
tion reduction scheme can be built by combining rationing and pricing. Nakamura
and Kockelman (2002) tested this theoretical framework on the San Francisco Bay
Bridge corridor. The authors pointed out several limitations in current studies and
recommended further research in this field. Smith and Chin (1997) concluded that
the VQS in Singapore is effective in controlling traffic, but it has to be complemented
by road pricing to yield higher net social impact. Wang (2010) did a qualitative in-
vestigation into different traffic demand management policies including ownership
quota systems. Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) did an emprical study in the Mexico
City ”Day without a Car” policy, and found that households purchase a second car
to get around this policy, making the congestion reduction effect insignificant. Zhu
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et al. (2012) examined the vehicle rationing and vehicle ownership policy with a
theoretical model, under the assumption that users are homogeneous. Their conclu-
sion is that under this assumption, vehicle ownership quota will always generate a
positive net social impact, while vehicle usage restriction with induced demand con-
sidered will result in a negative net social impact. Furthermore, congestion pricing
will outperform both rationing policies in terms of net social impact.
The study extends the theoretical model of Zhu et al. (2012) to evaluate the
welfare effects of the two quota policies and relaxed the assumption to heteroge-
neous user group. In order to consider the quota policy as a transportation demand
management tool that mitigates traffic congestion, this study follows the indirect
utility approach initiated by Dubin and McFadden (1984), and extends the model
previously proposed by De Jong (1990) to consider the joint decisions of vehicle own-
ership and usage under the two vehicle quota systems. These demand-side models
are then combined with supply-side models to capture the market equilibrium. Net





For a traveler who is facing various rationing policies, the decision of owning a
vehicle and the decision of using a vehicle are interrelated. Households will evaluate
their car buying decision based on how congested the roads are. If the operations
cost gets higher, it will be less likely for a family to own a vehicle. On the otherhand,
after any kind of ownership quota policy is implemented, mitigation effect on traffic
congestion will result in induced demand, and more households will be willing to own
vehicles. Therefore, to correctly capture these behavioral dynamics in reaction to
rationing policy, it is crucial to jointly model vehicle ownership and usage decisions.
The performance of the market dynamics should also depend on travel supply
(the marginal cost of traveling). Effect of quota policies is dependent of the level
of congestion in cities. To correctly model induced demand and capture network
equilibria under different policies, we should integrate travel demand and supply
models and generate market equilbrium in the analysis.
2.1 Travel Demand Model
This study follows the indirect utility approach initiated by Dubin and McFad-
den (1984) and extended by researchers including De Jong (1990); Goldberg (1998);
Hensher et al. (1992); Mannering and Winston (1985), and West (2004) because
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of its solid foundation in consumer behavior theory (for a comprehensive review,
see De Jong et al. (2004)). We consider a household who seeks to maximize its
utility under budget constraints. We consider two goods: vehicle usage (A) and all
other goods (X). The household faces a discrete choice of owning vehicles and a
continuous choice of vehicle usage conditional on the ownership choice. This joint
decision gives the consumption of vehicle usage and determines vehicle ownership.
The consumption of vehicle usage and all other goods yield positive marginal utility.
To derive the model, we must first specify a functional form for conditional
indirect utility, which has a one-to-one correspondence with the demand function.
A demand function linear in income and price has been used by Goldberg (1998);
Hensher et al. (1992); Mannering and Winston (1985); West (2004). However, the
demand could become negative as price increases under this specification. Also,
the linear model cannot consider the option of not owning a vehicle. In contrast,
De Jong (1996, 1990) adopted a double log specification, which is bounded to be
positive and performs well in an early empirical study. Thus utility of not owning
a vehicle can be derived. Therefore, this paper follows the second approach, while
maintaining consistency in connotation with other literature whenever possible.
From De Jong (1990), we assume the demand for driving Ai units of distance
(e.g. measured in annual Vehicle Mile Traveled (VMT)) by a household i with
annual income Yi is determined by:
lnAi = αi ln(Yi − C)− βip+ ei (2.1)
where: p is the operating cost per mile for the vehicle;
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C represents the annualized capital cost of owning a car;
ei summarizes unobserved household socio-economic and demographic charac-
teristics, and ei ∼ N (0, σ)
αi and βi are parameters.
Following Burtless and Hausman (1978), the corresponding indirect utility
function is:
V (p, Yi − C) =
1
βi
exp(ei − βip) +
1
1− αi
(Yi − C)1−αi (2.2)
We can easily verify this correspondence by applying Roy’s identity to 2.2,
which gives the demand function 2.1. To derive the utility of owning no vehicle,
De Jong (1990) observed that the optimal decision would be to not drive at all
when operating cost per mile p goes to infinite. Therefore, we have:
lim
p→∞






Thus the probability of owning a car is:
P(p) = P{ 1
1− α
(Y − C)1−α + 1
β





η = log[Y 1−α − (Y − C)1−α]− log(1− α) + log β (2.6)
Then,




In this study, it is assumed that households have a uniform income level Y ,
although this framework is capable to consider heterogeneous income level. Also we
will first only consider one traveler/vehicle per household and leave the complexity
of intra-household travel behavior for future research. In the following sections, the
word traveler or household will be used interchangeably.
Also, because
logAi = α log(Y − C)− βp+ ei (2.8)
Average VMT for the driving population is:












Combining 2.7 and 2.10, the aggregated demand is:
q(p) = H(Y − C)1−αe
σ2
2




Figure 2.1 describes the aggregated demand curve:
2.2 Travel Supply Model
To maintain the tractability of the analysis, we consider an stylized network
with only one link and one origin-destination pair. In the case of urban transporta-
tion network, when the trips are relatively evenly spread on the roads, and the
congestion is relativelty similar among different links, such stylized network with
one OD pair and a generalized capacity can be viewed as an abstract model for this
urban transportation network. It should be noted that under model this framework,
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate Demand Curve with Homogenous Travelers
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a real network supply model can potentially be implemented, and will be discussed
briefly in Chapter 5.
The total demand is carried by this idealized network, with road capacity (F ).
The generalized travel cost p is then a function of travel demand q.
p = φt(q) (2.12)
where φ is the value of time. To evaluate policies on the network with different
levels of congestion, this study employs a generalized Bureau of Public Roads (BPR)
function to describe the supply side. The total travel cost p is thus:




where: T0 captures the free flow time. ξ and ϕ are parameters whose values
allow us to model networks with different congestability (travel time elasticities).
In the most common BPR function, ξ = 0.15, ϕ = 4. As this paper focuses on
rationing policies and their impacts on market equilibrium, we assume other long
term costs such as fuel price remain constant and become part of φT0.
2.3 Network Equilibrium
Based on the demand and supply models introduced in the previous subsection,
this subsection analyzes market equilibrium conditions.
The equilibrium point (p0, q0) is solved by the following equation set:
q0 = H(Y − C)αe
σ2
2










Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium status when demand and supply curve
intersect.






















Figure 2.2: Network Equilibrium
So under the equilibrium status, households with ei ≥ η + betap0 will That is







Figure 2.3: Distribution of ei
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Chapter 3
Models for Vehicle Plate Lottery and Plate Auction Policy Analysis
In this chapter, two distinct ownership quota systems will be analyzed, namely
the plate lottery system and plate auction system.
From 2.14, initially at equilibrium status, HP(p0) of the households are willing
to own a vehicle. The quota policy, will restrict the vehicle ownership, issuing
θHP(p0) vehicle plates. Here θ ∈ (0, 1) will be a policy variable the authority need
to decide on.
3.1 A Compensating Variation(CV) Approach for Welfare Analysis
In previous studies, researchers have used consumer surplus(CS) to conduct
social welfare analysis. Consumer surplus is an approximation for the willingness-
to-pay (WTP) welfare measurement. It has a very straightforward graph implemen-
tation, which is the triangular area below demand curve and above the price line.
However in this study, since 2.2 and 2.4 are different in function form and are not
continuous when q → 0, consumer surplus is not applicable.
Instead in this study, compensating variation (CV) from Hicks (1946) is used.
It is defined as the money to be taken away from (or paid to when it’s negative)
the individual after an economic change, that leaves the individual with the same
utility value as before. Small and Rosen (1981) extended such welfare calculation
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method to discrete choice models. Mannering and Winston (1987); Winston and
Mannering (1984) have applied CV in transportation research regime.
3.2 Vehicle Plate Lottery System
In this model , zero entry fee to the lottery is always assumed. In fact, in places
where the lottery is actually implemented, the entry fee is neglect-able comparing
to household income. Also, the plates obtained from the lottery is not transferable.
This prevents the underground trading of the plates.
Since 1−θ portion of the households who initially own vehicles will be rationed
out, the roads will get less congested. Thus, more households will be interested
in the joining the lottery. A policy maker can decide the population this plate
lottery is open to. In the following deduction, two different implementations will
be considered. First is that this lottery will be open to the general public. This is
what the Beijing authority adopts.
3.2.1 Lottery open to the General Public
If the authority opens the plate lottery to everyone, a new equilibrium point
(p∗o, q
∗
o) will be achieved. From 2.7, HP(p
∗
o) will enter the lottery to win the
θHP(p0) number of vehicle plates. From 2.10, their average VMT is Ã(p∗o). Thus,
The new aggregated demand function will be:














The new equilibrium is given by the following equation set:




















Since p∗o < p0, P(p
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For each of the households who initially don’t own vehicles but enter the lottery
system now and actually win it, their ei ∈ [η + βp∗o, η + βp∗o].
Since the probability of winning the lottery is given by 3.3, Thus, the total














(Y − CV i1 − C)1−α +
1
β
exp(ei − βp∗o) (3.4)




CV o1 = εH
η+βp0∫
η+βp∗o












Then consider the households who initially own vehicles,their ei ∈ [η+βp0,+∞].




For the 1−ε portion of them who fail the lottery, their individual compensating
variation CV i2 is given by the following equation:
1
1− α
(Y − C)1−α + 1
β
exp(ei − βp0) =
1
1− α
(Y − CV i2 )1−α (3.6)
By aggregating the CV i2 ’s, the CV change from this group of households CV
o
2 is:
CV o2 = (1− ε)H
+∞∫
η+β+p0










For the ε portion of them who actually win the lottery, their individual com-












By aggregating the CV i3 ’s, the CV change from this group of households CV
o
3 is:
CV o3 = εH
+∞∫
η+β+p0












The CV change for the whole society is thus:





CV o1 and CV
o
3 are positive because of the mitigation of congestion by the
implementation of the quota system. CV o2 is negative due to the depriving of users
from owning a vehicle.
3.2.2 Lottery Open Only to Previous Owners
Another alternative for the lottery implementation is to open the system only
to those who own vehicles in the initial equilibrium. This policy can be an applicable
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way for the authority to control the number of vehicles in an already well developed
metropolitan area. So the authority stops issuing new plates and conduct a lottery
within the current driving population. Government will buy back the vehicles of
households who lose the lottery. Such policy hasn’t been implemented in any area
yet, this section focuses on the theoretical point of view and serves as a comparison
to the lottery system that opens to the general public.
For a given operation cost, the average VMT for household i who wins the








Thus the new aggregated demand function will be:
q′ = θH(Y − C)αe
σ2
2




Following this, the new equilibrium can be obtained from:
q∗o = θH(Y − C)αe
σ2
2










For the household i in the θ portion who win the lottery, its compensating

















CV oθ = θH
+∞∫
η+β+p0












For the household i in the 1 − θ portion who don’t win the lottery, its com-
pensating variation CV i1−θ is given by:
1
1− α
(Y − C)1−α + 1
β
exp(ei − βp0) =
1
1− α
(Y − CV i1−θ)1−α (3.16)
By aggregating the CV i1−θ’s, the CV change from this group of households
CV o1−θ is
CV o1−θ = (1−θ)H
+∞∫
η+β+p0










And thus, the CV change for the whole society is:
CV o = CV oθ + CV
o
1−θ (3.18)
3.3 Vehicle Plate Auction System
In this section, we will consider a sealed-bid auction system that the first
θHP(p0) best prices will win the auction, and therefore get to own a vehicle.
To quantitatively model this system, it is assumed in this work that the pop-
ulation size H is large, and for each individual i, he/she knows his/her own ei as
well as the distribution of ei (N (0, σ) in this case) .
The valuation for the plate for each individual i V (ei) is:









where p∗a is the operation cost per mile under equilibrium.
When the price of the plate is V (ei), household i is indifferent between owning
and not owning a vehicle.
Based on these assumptions, in the equilibrium status, the plate will go to
those who has higher V (ei) which is equivalent to the higher ei. The individuals










e∗a is solely determined by the initial equilibrium status before any quota policy
as well as the quota portion θ.
This is illustrated in figure 3.1.
e
i η+β p0 ea
*
Figure 3.1: Distribution of ei
It can be shown that under equilibrium status, households with ei ≥ e∗a will all
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submit V (e∗a), while those with ei ≤ e∗a will submit V (ei). As a matter of fact, since
for any individual household with ei ≥ e∗a, paying V (e∗a) guarantees a plate. Paying
more than that amount will decrease its utility. Paying less than that amount results
in not getting the plate. Either way, this household would be worse off should it
deviate with this strategy. For any individual household with ei ≤ e∗a, submitting
V (ei) means it will not get the plate. Paying more than V (ei) means it will be worse
off than not owning a vehicle even if it wins the lottery. Paying less than V (ei), and
this household still don’t get the plate. This means those households won’t have
incentive to deviate with this strategy. Thus a Nash equilibrium has been found.
From figure 1.3, the average and lowest winning bid of the Shanghai vehicle
plate auction do not differ a lot. This implies that assumptions and deduction of
the auction model has the representation power of the real world case.




a, V ) can be calculated as:













(Y − V − C)1−α + 1
β






For each of the households who initially own vehicles but didn’t win the auc-
tion, their ei ∈ [η + βp0, e∗a).





(Y − C)1−α + 1
β
exp(ei − βp0) =
1
1− α
(Y − CV i1−θ)1−α (3.22)
By aggregating the CV i1−θ’s, the CV change from this group of households
CV a1−θ is:
CV a1−θ = H
e∗a∫
η+β+p0









For each of the households who wins the auction, their ei ≥ e∗a.


















CV aθ = H
+∞∫
e∗a












Also, the revenue generated from the auction is θS(1− Φ(η+βp0
σ
))
The welfare change for the whole society is thus:
CV a = CV aθ + CV
a







In this section, numerical analysis will be conducted to look into the welfare
implications of the quota systems.
This study uses parameters reported by De Jong (1990):
Income elasticity of driving α = 0.49
Price elasticity of driving β = 0.028
Average annual income Y = 35000
Vehicle Price averaged in years C = 2536
We also set the parameters for supply-side function as: ϕ = 4 and ξ = 0.15 in
equation 2.13, which is a typical BPR function. We assume the free flow operation
cost γT0to be $5 and capacity F to be 30H for convenience.
With these parameters set up, the initial equilibrium can be calculated by 2.14.
Under equilibrium status, 59% of the households will choose to own a vehicle. The
operation cost per mile p0 = 27.5. Previous sections has discussed welfare change
calculations of the two plate lottery systems(open to general public and open only
to previous vehicle owners) and the plate auction system. Since all three policies
limits the number of vehicles on the road, a good comparison of the three will be
the compensating variation under the same quota percentage θ.
From figure 4.1, we can see that lottery that opens only to previous vehicle
24


















Lottery open to general public
Lottery open only to previous owners
Auction
Figure 4.1: Compensating Variation Comparison of the Policies
owners always outperform lottery that opens to the general public in terms of welfare
gain. This is because more households with lower preference of driving ei will be
attracted to the lottery knowing that there will be less congestion. In fact, when
the quota ratio is 0.8, which means to limit the number of vehicles to 80%, the
probability of winning this lottery is only 47%. As lottery is purely random, the
53% of the households who have high preference of driving but cannot own vehicles
will contribute a big welfare loss, comparing to the welfare gain generated by the
47% of the households with lower preference of driving and then win the lottery.
The welfare gain from the households who don’t previously own vehicles but enter
and win the lottery now is 30.1H, whereas the welfare loss from the households who
previously own vehicles but don’t win the lottery is as much as 321H.
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Plate auction system, comparing to both lottery systems, enjoys a higher wel-
fare gain. The auction mechanism guarantees that households with higher prefer-
ences of driving will always get the plate. Such arrangement will likely result in
a less effective congestion mitigation, as the individuals with higher preference of
driving will drive more. But since households will have to surrender part of their
salary in order to get the plate, this will indirectly help reduce traffic congestion.
The mitigation effect of each of the policies can be examined in terms of the
operation cost per mile at equilibrium. From Figure 4.2, lottery that opens to the
general public is most effective in congestion mitigation, whereas auction will result
in a relatively higher congestion level.





























Lottery open to general public
Lottery open only to previous owners 
Auction
Figure 4.2: Level of Congestion Comparison of the Policies
From figure 4.1, under this set of parameters, we can see that lottery system
26
that opens to the general public will always generate negative net social impact.
Next we look at another hypothetical supply model of a more congestible road with
higher marginal cost. Figure 4.3 shows the net social impact under the set of supply
curve parameters as ϕ = 8 and F remains 30H. From figure 4.3, we can see that
lottery system that opens to general public will be able to generate a positive welfare
gain. Comparing figure 4.1 and 4.3, we can observe that a more congestable supply
model will offer a higher welfare gain.





















Lottery open to general public
Lottery open onlyt to previous owners
Auction
Figure 4.3: Compensating Variation Comparison of the Policies Under Highly Con-
gestible Supply Side Parameters
Unlike lottery system, welfare gain of the auction system comes from the
revenue collected from selling the vehicle plates. In fact, when looking all households
will have a lower utility level after the auction policy is implemented. Figure 4.4
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shows the revenue generated from auction under different quota ratios. Figure 4.5
shows the price of a vehicle plate under different quota ratios. Under this set of
parameters, limiting the quota ratio to 36% will generate highest revenue, and price
of the vehicle plate is $3141 . Meanwhile, limiting the ratio to 45% will generate
highest welfare gain, and price of vehicle plate is $2450.




















Figure 4.4: Revenue Generated from Auction
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Traffic congestion has caused huge economic loss and environmental pollution
every year. As a transportation demand management policy to reduce congestion,
vehicle ownership quota system that directly controls the number of vehicles on
the road, has recently been adopted in some metropolitan areas, including Beijing
and Shanghai. When it comes to implementation of quota system, Beijing uses the
plate lottery system, so that everyone interested in owning a vehicle can participate
and there’s no monetary transaction in the process. Shanghai, on the other hand,
uses the plate auction system and participants bid for the limited number of vehicle
plates available. This thesis aims at building a theoretical model that quantitatively
analyze the benefits of such policies.
This studies extends the joint decision model of vehicle ownership and mileage
model, and applied compensating variation method to measure the net social impact
change of the different quota systems. Under this proposed framework, a numerical
example is conducted. This example shows that plate auction system will yield
a higher net impact than plate lottery system. Lottery system will attract more
households participating, and thus lowering the chances of winning for those with
higher preference to own vehicles. This will lower the net social impact. Since
the ownership quota system serves as a policy tool to fight traffic congestion, the
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congestion mitigation effect is also investigated. The auction mechanism allows
people with higher preference for driving to own vehicles, whereas the lottery system
does not distinguish between different levels preferences. Meantime, winners of
the plate auction surrender part of their income in the auction, which decreases
their driving. According to the numerical example, lottery system still performs
better than auction system in terms of reduction in congestion. Also, under a more
congestable network, all three ownership quota systems will provide a higher net
social impact.
Being a theoretical model, this thesis has made several assumptions to main-
tain tractability of the analysis. Nonetheless, under all these assumptions, empiri-
cal data has supported many of the arguments in this thesis. The low variance in
Shanghai vehicle plate price have confirmed that under equilibrium status, winning
bidders will all pay the market clearance price. Also, this study concluded that
plate lottery system will attract participants that have lower preference of owning
a vehicle. Figure 1.4 shows that no more the 10% of the participants can win the
lottery. From the numerical example, we see that this mechanism is harmful for the
benefit of society, in terms of the aggregated net social impact. Thus, this study
also proposed another alternative to conduct plate lottery, which is to limit lottery
access to previous car owners only. This alternative will yield a higher net social
impact comparing to the lottery that opens to everyone.
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5.1 Future Research
This thesis has set up a theoretical framework to look at different transporta-
tion policy implications. Assumptions have been made in both demand and supply
side models. Future research can be conducted to relax those assumptions and thus
make the model more realistic.
In the supply side model, an idealized one link network is assumed. In fact,
in the real world, trips start from different origins and end at different destinations.
Congestion levels on different links also differ, because of the demand that make
use of the links and the capacity of each link. Thus, a meaningful extensions of this
research is to a network. To give a simple example, we can look at a two origin
one destination network in figure 5.1. In this figure, the origins 1 and 2, each have
H1 and H2 number of households. FA, FB and FC are the road capacity of link















Figure 5.1: Two origin one destination network
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
q1 = H1(Y − C)αe
σ2
2




p1 = ζ1φT0(1 + ξ(
q1 + q2
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q2 = H2(Y − C)αe
σ2
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p2 = ζ2φT0(1 + ξ(
q1 + q2
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In fact, after the traffic flow is determined, the average operation cost per
mile is also known. More generally, the supply side model for a household h can be
expressed as ph(q1, q2, ..., qn), which is function of the demand of the n O-D pairs.
And the general term for the equilibrium can written as 5.2. Future research can
be conducted to look into the integration of network modeling into this studies.
Such extension is very meaningful since after the demand management policy is
implemented, people may as well change their route choice. Also, the network
element will allow the model to consider policies that take effect on specific origins
or destinations. 
q1 = H1(Y − C)αe
σ2
2





qn = Hn(Y − C)αe
σ2
2





1(q1, q2, ..., qn)
......
pn = p
n(q1, q2, ..., qn)
(5.2)
In addition, in the auction model, it is assumed that all participates are aware
of the distribution of ei, or equivalently the distribution of individual’s valuation.
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However, such information is not available in reality. In fact, the authority of
Shanghai publish only the market clearing price and the average price for the vehicle
plate. So another extension will be to look at the occasion where individuals hold
different beliefs for the valuation distribution.
To give an example, assume that the households holds two different beliefs of
the standard deviation of ei. Instead of the true value σ, κ portion of the population
believe the standard deviation to be σ1, while the rest 1−κ believe it to be σ2. And
σ2 < σ < σ1. Therefore, for the κ portion of the households who have ei ≥ eκ, they
will submit V (eκ) for the plate. The κ portion of households who have e1−κ < ei < eκ
will submit their true valuation of the plate V (ei). These two groups are guaranteed
to get the vehicle plate. The 1 − κ portion of households who has ei ≥ e1−κ will
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